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TRADITIONALLY, the responsibility of the 
Master for damages caused by his servant 
has been an acknowledged principle of Ci-
vil Law. The basis of this responsibility 
is the Roman Law principle 'qui facit per 
alias facit per se• which has been repto· 
duced in modem times, subject to exigenc-
ies of time and place. The Maltese Civil 
Code embodies the principle in section 
1080; the English system accepts it under 
the doctrine of vicarious liability, and the 
Italian Code of 1865 followed the Code 
Napoleon in a similar provision in section 
1153. The 1942 Civil Code says much the 
same thing in article 2049: 'I padroni e i 
committenti sono responsabili pet i danni 
arrecati dal fatto illecito dei loro domes-
tici e commessi nell'esercizio delle in· 
combenze a cui soao adibiti•. Materially 
there is DO difference between section 
1153(s) of the older Code and the provi-
sion of section 2049. The difference is 
one of principle in that the responsibility 
of Masters and Employers, founded on a 
different concept than that of parents and 
tutors is dealt with in a separate section. 
The basis of this liability is that Mas-
ters and Employers are responsible for da-
mages caused by their servants and em-
ployees independently of their personal 
fault. This principle -carries an amount of 
rigidity because whereas the provisions 
immediately preceding section 2049 con• 
template the right of those responsible for 
those under their care, to prove 'di non 
aver potuto impedire i1 facto', no such re-
servation is admitted under sectioo 2049. 
From one point of view, this is a form of 
indirect respoasibility which arises from 
the actions of a different person, beyond 
his legitimate sphere of action, and as 
such, therefore, delictual. But there are 
some writers who consider such responsi-
bility as Direct. To Paladini {Responsa-
bilita civile e penale p. 36-37) the fact 
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that a particular act by the subordinate 
produces ipso facto the responsibility of 
the principal, is to be considered direct 
responsibility ex hypotesi. The difference 
between the two points of view seems only 
to be one of terminology and as such im-
material for our present purpose. 
The important thing here is the respon-
sibility without fault. It was once thought 
that this responsibility was based on the 
absolute presumption iutis et de iure which 
embraced an abstract concept of faith not 
in conformity with reality. But where fault 
cannot be proved liability is not to arise 
for presumed fault: 'Una colpa che c pre· 
sunta', says Cogliola 'c una conuadiziooe 
in se stessa perche si viene a dire che 
col pa nel committente non c' c', ma che la 
legge la presume per utilita sociale; e al-
l~ra non c meglio trovare in questa utilica 
la ragione della legge senza ricorrere a 
concerti fittizii?' 
A variation of this absolute presumption 
was that of Culpa in Eligendo vel Vigi-
lando. This doctrine was ei:pounded by 
Baudrio·Lecaucinerie and Giorgio and is 
in fact the one accepted by our Code: 
•Where a person for any Work or service 
whatsoever employs another person who is 
incompetent, or whom he has ao reason-
able grounds to consider competent, he 
shall be liable for any damage which such 
other person may, through incompetence 
in the performance of such work or service 
cause to others• section 1080. In this case, 
Masters and Employers who are free to 
choose servants and employees are held 
liable OD the basis of their negligence in 
the exercise of their choice, that is to say 
on the basis of 'Culpa in Eligeodo•. Such 
a fault is presumed iuris et de iure with-
out the possibility of proof to the contrary. 
Not so however with regard to Parents 
and Tutors who are responsible for their 
wards. In their case the presumption is 
only iuris tantum aod liability exists in· 
sofar as they cannot prove 'di oon aver 
potuto impedire il danoo'. 
Contrary to what may appear at first 
sight, the section under discussion al-
though faithful to the traditional concept 
of Indirect Responsibility departs to a 
considerable extent from the doctrine of 
No Pesponsibility uithout fault. Certain• 
ly, both doctrine and Case Law have beea 
inclined to accept the absolute presump· 
tion of fault based oo the wrong choice of 
the servant or employee. But this presump· 
tion does not account for cases where both 
Master and Employer having exercised the 
maximum amount of care remain respon· 
sible for the negligent performance of 
their subordinates. To this effect De Cu· 
pis points out: 'e inutile, per il commit· 
tente, provare che egli ha scelto benc e 
che quindi non puo parlarsi di Culpa in 
Eligendo, precisamente perche la sua res· 
ponsibilica e independentemence dalla col-
pa'. 
Some writers have dwelt on the doctrine 
of Representation of fault. But it is diffi· 
cult to accept this doctrine, as it is based 
on the fictitious transfer of liability from 
the servant to the Master •Ma a quest'altra 
teoria e stato obiettato che, se davvero 
avvenisse una proiezzione del fatto del 
domestico o commesso sulla persona del 
padrone o committente, non spiegherebbe 
il sussistere della responsabilita del do· 
mestico o commesso accanto a quella del 
padrone o committente'. On the other hand 
since this is a question of responsibility 
without fault the ratio legis must be sought 
elsewhere. 
Various writers including Barassi, Pac· 
chioni and Trimarchi adopt the theory of 
Rischio Profitto, in which •secondo l'opin· 
ione piu evoluta si identifichi la respon• 
sabilita del preponente con quella dell'im• 
presa; cosi da uadurne il peso in un de· 
mento di costi che l'imprenditore deve te· 
ner presence e puo riversare attraverso il 
mecchanismo dei prezzi sulla massa dei 
consumatori (e del resto puo cautetarzi 
contro il rischio con il ricorso all'assi· 
curazione (Nov. Digesto). Since the Master 
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has made use of the services of his ser· 
vane for his owo benefit, he has to accept 
as well the consequences arising from 
such an activity. Considering that the law 
in oo way, refers to the social and econo· 
mical implications which the authors of 
this theory have indicated Professor Re· 
nato Scognamiglio is prone to discard the 
theory as incorrect. The theory of risk aod 
profit would not exhaust all the possible 
relations between the master and the ser· 
vant, the employer and the employee. In· 
deed, one is left to wonder what would be 
the type of responsibility if the Master 
entrusts his servant with a personal un· 
dertakiog, quite independent of any eco-
nomic considerations. 
Perhaps the responsibility of the Prin· 
cipal for damages incurred by his subor· 
dinate is best explained by De Cupis in 
'La critica della cricica' basing himself 
on the well-known saying: Cuius commoda 
eius incommoda. The Responsibility aris· 
ing from the provisions of section 2049 
presuppose a casual relationship between 
the entrusting of the duties and the damage 
produced by the exercise of those duties. 
'Orbene, a questo rapporto, cosi struttura• 
to, corrispoode un particolare interesse 
del datore di lavoro, che consegna l'utili· 
ta ioerente all' acti vita del lavoratore, cal 
quale questa attivita e da lui, per i propri 
fini, diretta e regolata. E poiche la mede-
sima attivica, intensamente vincolata a fa. 
vore de! datore di lavoro, puo produrre dao-
ni a terzi giustizia wole cbe il datore di 
lavoro sia responsabile di tali danni, in 
conformica dell'antico principio secondo 
cui particolari cffetti pregiudizicndi non 
possono scindersi da particolari effetti 
util.i, le posizioni di piu intenso vantaggio 
hanoo da esscre bilaociate dal peso di 
una particolare responsabilica ("cuius com-
moda cius et incommoda") (163)' (De Cu-
pi s •u Danno' p. 152). 
The liability which the Master or Em-
ployer is to assume is part of the risk ac-
companying the services enuusted to the 
servant or employee. It is because the im-
mediate cause of the damage is linked up 
with an activity directed towards the be· 
nefit of the Master or Employer that the 
latter is liable vis-a-vis the third patty in-
dependently of any fault oo his pare. Inso· 
far as he has initiated a kind of relacioo-
ship which ultimately results io damage 
he is to be considered the Mediate cause. 
De Cupis accepts the theory of 'Rischio 
d'Impresa' as the logical explanation of 
this type of responsibility. He goes so far 
as to say that: 'se la responsabilita dei 
padroni e dei commitcenti costicuisce la 
cootropartica di una situazione di vancag-
gio, essa e destinaca a venir meno ove man-
chi quest'ultima: in altre parole, se nessun 
utile personale si recava dalropera altrui 
affidaca, cessa la «ratio" che ispira la leg-
ge, e questa non va applicata (cessaote ra• 
tione Legis, cessat et ipsa Lex). I soggetti 
che si propongoao un fine filantropico an-
ziche speculative, non sono responsabili ex 
arcicolo in esame del danno arrecato dai 
propri dipendenti'. Incidentally chis view 
is held by Mosca ( vide 'Nuovi studi e nuo-
ve doctrine sulla colpa') and Gabba ('Quis-
tiooi di diritto Civile' 11 page 271). As 
pointed out already, this theory of Rischio-
Profitto has been criticized by Scognamigl-
io according to whose opinion, responsi-
bility under arcicolo 2049, cao be attribut-
zd co any relationship between 'un padtone 
e un domestico' aod 'un committente ed un 
commesso'. That is exactly why he rejects 
the theory of Rischio Profitto and refuses 
to limit such a responsibility to that sphere 
of liability. 
The hardened position taken by De Cu· 
pis in 1958 when he was writing 'DEI FAT• 
TI ILLECITI' (Vide Commentario del Codice 
Civile Libro Quarto - Delle Obbligazioni) 
has been reviewed in his recent work '11 
Danno' (1970), which explores the intel-
lectual hinterland in the theory of respon• 
sibility, probably as a result of the criti· 
cism levelled at his theory. His answer 
has been quite convincing. The starting 
point remains, that the burden of risk is 
justified by the utility accruing from the 
relationship and within the sphere of ac-
tivity which he directs. 'Quale che sia 
questa destinazione' he says 'anche se 
essa abbia carattere liberale e meramente 
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filanttopico t cio non altera la realizzazzio-
oe dell'interesse deldatore di lavoro all'in· 
temo del rapporto di lavoro, e non puo 
quindi ri volgere a fini liberali e fi lantropi-
ci risultati del lavoro che intendano rivol-
gere ai fini liberali e filantropici i risulca-
ti del lavoro per essi svolto rispondono ex 
arc. 2049 dei danni arrecati ai terzi dai 
lavoratori nell' esercizio delle affidace in-
combenze'. 
le seems possible to deduce from what 
has been considered, that generally, any 
type of relationship between a principal 
and his subordinate is contemplated by 
this article. The extent to which it finds 
application, depends upon the particular 
instances to which it is applied and no 'a 
priori' definition could be laid down. Var-
ious commentators have upheld the idea 
that liability would arise even if the of-
fice under which the employee is acting is 
one of appointment or is imposed. The im-
portant element here is the relationship 
between the Principal who has ordered and 
the subordinate who is encrusted with the 
undertaking. ~ long as the Master or Em-
ployer have 'una normale e giuridica pos· 
sibilita di concrollo e di sorveglianza, sul 
lavoratore, in virtil del potere directive 
spettaote al datore di lavoro', a relation-
ship exists which is sanctioned by article 
2049. It ·is immaterial whether that power 
conforms or otherwise with strict supervi-
sion so long as control and supervision 
are possible from the nature of the rela-
tionship. Jn practice such degree of cont· 
rol may not exist, but chat is no excuse to 
exclude responsibility. It is only were the 
the possibility of control is incompatible 
with the juridical nature of the relation· 
ship, that responsibility is excluded. This 
even, where the principal has ordered spe,; 
cific works to be carried out. Because 
there is no risk where the control of the 
action for which oae is responsible is .im· 
possible from the very nature of the rela-
tionship. How can I be held liable for da-
mages which the plasterer whom I employ 
incurs when his activity is totally out of 
my cootrol? '11 rischio d'impresa ooa puo 
escendersi a danni verificatasi oello svol-
g.imento di un lavoro che, seppure eseguito 
per l'interesse dell'imprenditore, e es• 
traneo alla sf era del suo potere diretti vo ••• 
II rischio, invero non puo incombere su 
chi non ha il potere di ridurre il pericolo 
incrisce' (De Cupis 'Del Danoo' p.157 
Vol.111). However where the principal is 
not the 'de iure' incumbent of the respon• 
sibilities, as when a temporary person is 
entrusted with supervision of work ordered 
by the principal responsible under art. 
2049 subsists, nevertheless. In fact the 
responsibility envisaged in this article a-
rises from the 'lavori subordinaci' which 
are contemplated. Any deviation from this 
rule would negative any responsibility on 
the part of the principal, and this is the 
case where the nature of work undertaken 
does not allow for direction and supervi-
sion of the Employer or Principal. Where 
however the principal, maliciously orders 
such work to be executed with the full 
knowledge that damages may ensue then 
he would be the mediate cause of damage 
and as such, therefore, accountable. Where 
the relationship between the principal and 
the subordinate does not partake in the na-
ture of 'subordinazione gerarchica' con• 
templated in section 2049, then responsi· 
bility of the principal doe~ not arise. For 
instance, a mandator cannot be held res-
ponsible for damages incurred by a Man• 
datory. 
Up to a certain extent, this kind of res• 
ponsibility is objective, insofar as it ex• 
ists independently of any fault of the per• 
son responsible. Where the principal is 
not responsible for damages sustained by 
his subordinate, then ordinarily responsi• 
bility falls upon the subordinate who is 
the author of the delictual action. Howev• 
er, art. 2049 is not all that could be said 
of any responsibility arising from the re• 
lationship of Master - Servant, Employer -
Employee. Otherwise the principal may be 
held responsible under art. 2043 for having 
been the mediate cause of damages. But 
in this case the burden of proof lies with 
the person who has suffered the damage. 
The Italian Legal System has gone so 
far as to apply the princ;iple of indirect 
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responsibility, also in relation to che state. 
The state is held liable for acts done by 
its employees in the course of their duties. 
Thus, says Cammeo (Corso di Dicitto Am· 
ministrati vo p. 619) 'un 'altra dottrina •••• 
Ammette la responsabilica per questi de· 
sumendola dai principi di cliritto privato 
desumendola dai prindpi di dit:itto privato 
a tali atti applicabili, e predsamente dal-
la norm a del diritto civile contenuca nell' art. 
1153 (2048, 2049) Cod. Civ; per cui i com· 
mitteoti sono responsabili degli atti dei 
loro commessi, •• •• '. Le Persone giuridi· 
chc, e l'amministrazione in particolare 
come si avvantaggiano dall'attiyica lecita 
delle persone fisiche che formano i loro 
organi, cosi debbono sopportare le conse· 
guenze della loro attivica illeci.ta'. This 
is nothing but the doctrine of 'cius com· 
moda cius incommoda' in its pure applica-
tion. 
Maltese Law on the subject has not been 
so clear and so assertive. Positive legis· 
lation does not contain anything to this 
effect, and any application by the courts 
has followed the lines of doctrinal inter· 
precation. But that has not been very con• 
sistent either, and any positive statement 
on the position cannot allow for dogmatic 
predicaments. The difficulties which have 
to be superseded partially arise from the 
unsolved problem of whether to attribute 
to the Government any liability in choos· 
ing its servants. Italian writers have ar· 
gued, that this type of liability cannot be 
applied co the Government, since Govern· 
ment appoints its servants on the basis of 
examination and relevant qualifications. 
This would make the application of section 
1080 (Culpa in Eligendo) impossible where 
the Government is concerned. Modem wri· 
ters on the subject tend to regard the ap· 
plication of Culpa in Eligendo in Govern-
ment Liability with disfavour. The reason 
is simple: one cannot appreciate a recon• 
ciliation of sec. 1080 with the liability of 
the Government while on the ocher hand 
the theory of Rischio d'Impresa which 
forms the basis of art. 2049 of the Italian 
Code can be extended eveo as fat as the 
Administration is concerned. 
